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MR. ZHANG: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
Welcome to the Copyright Panel. My name is Steven Zhang and I
am the Symposium Editor of the Journal.
This year our panel will be discussing the fair use issue—its
application, limitations, and future. We have a wonderful panel
here. I would like to thank everyone here, and also everyone who
has been supporting us since June in the preparation of this
Symposium. I would also like to thank Professor Hansen, who is
really the mastermind behind all this. Without him, we could not
prepare this Symposium.
The moderator of this panel is Sonia Katyal. She is teaching
intellectual property law classes here at Fordham Law School, and
also civil rights classes and property classes. She has multiple
publications on these subjects.
Without further ado, I will turn it over to Professor Katyal.
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PROFESSOR KATYAL: Thanks so much.
Greetings and thanks for coming to the final panel of our
Intellectual Property Symposium for today, the much-awaited
Copyright Panel, where we will focus on the ever-changing and
ever-controversial issue of fair use.
Let me actually just start off by thanking our distinguished
panelists for coming to speak at Fordham today, and also the
organizers of today’s Symposium; in addition, of course, to the
staff and the moderators of the Fordham Intellectual Property,
Media & Entertainment Law Journal, who have done a great job of
selecting folks to talk about some of the various conflicts and
considerations that we see in today’s changing field of intellectual
property law.
Sort of along these lines, fair use represents the best
personification, in my view, of the various public and private
considerations that animate the utilitarian balance within copyright
law. It is also an area that, despite its statutory construction, is
meant to be inherently malleable and flexible in order to adapt to
the changing obligations and considerations regarding new
technologies.
But it is also, precisely because of its malleability, incredibly
subject to serious conflict and judicial variance in its interpretation.
So the last few years have seen an enormously important slew of
decisions regarding fair use—fair use in parody,1 fair use regarding
peer-to-peer technologies,2 open access issues with respect to
research, thumbnail photographs within search engines,3 anticircumvention issues, musical sampling, safe-harbor issues with
respect to Internet service providers, and so on. These are just a
few of the issues that I think are currently challenging the fair use
doctrine.
Many of these cases turn on the foundational and more
philosophically rich question of whether or not we should think
1

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
3
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc.,
416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
2
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about fair uses as a right, a privilege, a defense, or a limited
creature of common law and statutory construction. Many
commentators and judges, some of whom are on this panel, often
have different views on this question, which often animates the
divergence between narrow and broad constructions of fair use.
In addition, many of these issues are also overshadowed by the
increasing reach of digital rights management and other
technological controls over content that often foreclose or
potentially narrow fair-use interests for consumers, often forcing
us to explore whether or not fair use is becoming increasingly
determined by technological controls rather than judicial
constructions in its favor. So all of this is happening within the
law.
But at the same time, outside of the law we see so many of
these debates raging within the changing field of digital
technology, where we actually see on the Web a tremendous
explosion of illegitimate content through the use of sites like
YouTube,4 prompting one commentator, Tim Wu, who is at
Columbia, to herald a new phrase, the phenomenon of “tolerated
use” rather than fair use, where copyright owners allow for a
limited circulation of illegitimate content precisely because they
recognize it either increases the market value of their brands or it
does not necessarily harm preexisting markets in their content.5
This confluence, a potential narrowing of fair use marked by a
potential expansion of tolerated use, signifies perhaps a new role
for copyright law and potentially a new role for digital content
generally.
Our speakers today are in many ways architects of the
academic policy and judicial angles regarding fair use. Allow me
to just introduce them all and then we will hear from each one.
Our first speaker will be Paul Aiken, Executive Director of The
Authors Guild in New York. Our second speaker will be Laura
Quilter, who is Counsel at The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU
4

YouTube, http://www.youtube.com. YouTube is a website that allows individuals to
upload and share video clips.
5
See Tim Wu, Does YouTube Really Have Legal Problems?, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2006,
http://slate.com/id/2152264.
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School of Law. Our third speaker will be David Carson, who
serves as General Counsel for the U.S. Copyright Office in
Washington, D.C. Fourth we will hear from John Palfrey, who is
Executive Director of The Berkman Center for Internet and
Society at Harvard Law School. Last, but definitely never least,
we will hear from our own Hugh Hansen, Professor at Fordham
School of Law.
Thank you so much. Let’s actually start. I will turn things
over to Paul. Thank you.
MR. AIKEN: Thank you, Sonia.
Let me start things out. There has been an increasingly fierce
debate about fair use in all sorts of forums and all sorts of media. I
thought I would start by talking about some of the broad public
policy concerns, starting at the most basic with copyright itself, the
public policy issues around copyright.
Often we are told that we have to balance the interests between
rights holders and the public when we look at copyright issues. I
think that is largely a false distinction. In many ways, the public’s
interests are perfectly lined up with rightsholders’, because the
interest in both is to create a real market for copyrighted goods.
The public’s interest is in creating a market for books, movies,
and music so people can go out and buy books, movies, and music
that they value. When we hear that the public’s interest is in, say,
a large public domain, that is partly right. There is of course a
genuine interest in a public domain, but that interest is secondary,
and always has been secondary in copyright. Easily 90 percent of
the value that copyright creates is in the market itself. We have to
be careful that we do not undermine that market as we act in the
supposed interest of the public or we risk destroying what we
intended to create.
We have in this country a very strong market in food. No one
asks, “What is the public’s interest in the food market? I want to
go to the market and get potatoes for free.” We do not talk in those
terms. We understand that just by creating a market for food,
allowing people to go to the market and easily buy potatoes, we are
acting in the public interest.
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Another myth about copyright is that copyright is frequently
spoken of as a monopoly. I guess in some sense it is a monopoly.
It is a monopoly in the same sense that I have a monopoly in the
use of my car or my house—I can decide how it is used; I can
decide who is allowed in and who is not allowed in. But it is a
very weak monopoly.
The types of monopolies we are concerned about as a matter of
policy are those sorts that allow one to corner a market. A
copyright monopoly in almost all instances does not allow one to
corner a market. If Dan Brown, who wrote The Da Vinci Code,
and Random House think they have a monopoly and so with his
next book decide to charge $90, they will quickly find out that they
do not have a monopoly, that the relevant market is not Dan Brown
books but novels generally, or mystery novels or thrillers
generally. Copyright is not the sort of monopoly that we should be
concerned about.
Copyright is often spoken of—a third myth—as locking up
ideas. Copyright does not. This is fundamental but bears
repeating. Copyright protects expression, not ideas.6 Most
lawyers, of course, know this, but I hear this misrepresented time
and again, even by experts, copyright professors, that copyright is
somehow locking up ideas. It does not. It just locks up
expression, the creative expressions of authors and others, and
allows them to make money on those works through the
marketplace.
Paul Goldstein of Stanford Law School often speaks of the
idea-expression dichotomy as creating a vast commons coursing
through every copyrighted work, the publicly held and freely
copyable ideas the work contains.7 Certainly that is right.
If a particular author has creatively expressed an idea so well
that another feels compelled to copy that particular expression,
then one needs permission—that is, a license—and that is as it
6

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
See Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Commons, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2005–2006);
Fair Use: Its Effects on Consumers and Industry: Hearing Before Subcomm. On
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, 108th Cong. 6 (2005) (Statement of Paul
Aiken, Author’s Guild), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/
Hearings/11162005hearing1716/Aiken.pdf.
7
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should be. A well-crafted expression should be compensated, or
the borrower should simply limit the excerpt to the bounds of fair
use.
Now let’s move on to fair use in particular. We are told time
and again that in order for a copyright to fulfill its constitutional
purpose of promoting the arts and useful sciences and to provide a
real public benefit, we have to make sure fair use is adequately
broad.8 But this misapprehends the primary value of copyright, as
we have seen, and the role of fair use in the copyright system.
Fair use, as most of you know, was originally a judicial
doctrine, now codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act.9 It has
traditionally helped define the boundary between commerce and
free expression, between the commercial incentives secured by
copyright and the right to free expression protected by the First
Amendment.
Authors, of course, are really big fans of copyright, because
authors like to get paid. But they are also big fans of traditional,
transformative fair use. Say an author is writing a history of the
Great Depression and finds a recent article in which some scholar
says that the Depression was caused by the stock market crash of
1929. This drives the author nuts, because she believes it is well
established that the stock market crash was only one of several
factors causing the Depression. She wants to quote from this
article to show just how wrongheaded it is. But the article is
protected by copyright and its author may not be inclined to grant
her permission to excerpt the work.
So what does our historian do? She uses it anyway. She
copies a reasonable amount of that article, enough to make her
point, and puts it into her own book, surrounding it with her
commentary and criticism. She demolishes the scholar’s thesis
using his own words against him, and there is nothing that author
can do about it.

8

See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
Id. at 576. “Fair use doctrine remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act.” Id. Compare Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–
45 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
9
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That author can do nothing about it, at least in terms of her use
of his copyrighted work, because this is classical transformative
fair use of the original author’s work.10 She has taken a part of his
copyrighted work and transformed it, including it in a new creative
expression, something completely unlike his work.
As a society, we see real value in this sort of transformative
borrowing from another’s work. It is a vital part of the
marketplace of ideas that free expression is meant to encourage.
And it is everywhere—in book and movie reviews, of course;
biographical and historical works; scientific and academic books
and journals; novels and plays; poetry and songs.
Section 107 mediates between protected expression and free
expression by setting forth four factors for a court to weigh in
considering whether a use is fair, factors intended to permit the
excerpting of copyrighted works needed for new creative
expression, so long as the effect on the commercial market for the
work is minimal.11
An unfortunate result of the use of four factors to determine the
bounds of fair use is that fair use appears to be a bit mushy.
Advocates of all stripes can and do read into fair use what they
care to read into it.
Fair use now is often seen as another flavor of the public
domain. That is perhaps one way to think of it, but it is of an
entirely different nature than copyright’s real public domain. Fair
use does not mean free use of entire works; that is the realm of
genuine public domain. Fair use, in fact, has been transmuted by
some into free use or good use or any other use that some interest
group, industry, or a corporation wants to make of copyrighted
works without paying for them. This is not, and should not, be
what fair use is about. If we keep our eye on the true role of fair
use—permitting the creation of new creative expressions without
harming the commercial market for the work—we will not lose our
way.
Let me close there for my opening remarks.
10
11

See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000); Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (discussing “transformative”).
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590.

PANEL_III_FORMATTED_050807

1024

5/8/2007 1:04:06 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:1017

PROFESSOR KATYAL: Thank you.
Next we will hear from Laura Quilter.
MS. QUILTER: Thank you, Paul and Sonia.
Fair use, I think, is something that I am very supportive of, as a
creator myself and as a general advocate for free expression. Fair
use is shaped significantly by public policy and by statute, as Paul
has gone over with us. But it is also shaped significantly by the
actual practice of private parties, and that is what I want to talk
about today, how private parties interact with fair use in the most
common way in which copyright disputes are handled. That
includes looking at cease-and-desist letters, looking at the initial
sorts of ways that people attempt to resolve disputes.
Let me back up from there and say several years ago, in the
mid- to late-1990s, copyright holders, the large entertainment
industries in particular, were very concerned about copyright
infringement taking place on the Internet. And so, among other
things, they spoke to Congress about trying to get some way to
deal with this in the most expedient way possible, which would be
to go after Internet service providers and get them to take material
down when it was plainly infringing. So they were really
concerned basically that somebody would be posting significant
numbers of MP3s to their Web sites.
The ISPs got involved in this. Together, they ended up crafting
in Congress a series of provisions for the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which are perhaps lesser known than
the § 1201 anti-circumvention provisions but which have turned
out to be very significant in mediating how people actually interact
with copyright.
These provisions basically set forth a series of safe harbors,
limited and contingent safe harbors, for Internet service
providers—what I call “online service providers” [hereinafter
“OSP”] after the statute—based on what kind of online service
they provide and what they have to do to get access to the safe
harbor. I am going to run through those very quickly, and then I
am going to tell you a little bit about three studies that have gone
on already and that are progressing that really look at how this
actually plays out in the real world.

PANEL_III_FORMATTED_050807

2007

5/8/2007 1:04:06 PM

COPYRIGHT PANEL: FAIR USE

1025

Of these provisions, there are three that are the most relevant
and important provisions of § 512 for you guys to think about.
The first one is § 512(a), which directs what online Internet
access providers have to do.12 This one is a fairly straightforward
safe harbor. It says that Internet access providers—meaning your
broadband, your dial-up, your DSL provider, your cable
provider—have a safe harbor so long as they develop and
reasonably implement a takedown provision for repeat infringers.13
But other than that, if they have a policy that they implement for
repeat infringers, they are good. They do not have to worry about
being possibly liable for their subscribers’ copyright
infringements.14
Now, this one is important, because the broadband providers—
Comcast and AT&T and Earthlink—are the ones who are
providing access to the peer-to-peer file sharers. This was not even
a twinkle in the eyes of the copyright and ISP industries in 1998
when the DMCA was drafted. So they were happy to concede,
“Hey, let’s get a straightforward safe harbor and move on.”
They moved on to § 512(c), which has a fairly elaborated
notice and takedown process. Section 512(c) applies to your Web
hosts basically, people who are running computer systems and
hosting somebody else’s content—your Web hosts, your email
lists, archive providers, those kinds of people.15
It includes this notice and takedown process, which says if you
are a copyright holder and you feel that somebody’s work is
infringing on a Web site, you can send a notice, and so long as the
OSP expeditiously removes the content or disables access to it, the
OSP has a safe harbor from potential copyright liability for hosting
that material.16
There is a counter-notice provision, which says, “Hey, if the
user, the subscriber to the service, feels that they were wronged,

12
13
14
15
16

17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 512(c).
Id. § 512(c)(1), (3).
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they can submit a counter-notice and say ‘put it back up,’ and after
a certain amount of back and forth, the material can go back up.”17
So § 512(c) is the most elaborated process in this statutory
scheme.
Section 512(d), interestingly, applies to information location
tools, search engines. It provides a safe harbor for linking to
content that could be infringing.18 It is really questionable, if you
think about it, what sort of infringement might have occurred
anyway. If you simply tell someone where to go to find
something, maybe you are enabling it.
The case law was really not there. So one might wonder what
they were bargaining for when they were in Congress trying to get
this. But basically it says: “If you provide notice to a search
engine, if you provide notice to Google, that they are linking in
their search engine to somebody who is infringing copyright, if
they take it down, they have a safe harbor from whatever liability
they might have had for linking to that content.”19
There is no counter-notice provision attached to that because
the people who are at the search engine are indexing, they are not
clients of the search engine. The search engine owes them no duty.
There is really no good reason to give them a counter-notice
process.
A couple of other provisions to note:
Section 512(f) offers a remedy for intentional
misrepresentations by either notice senders or counter-notice
senders.20 That remedy is available to the OSP, to the notice
recipient (the notice target), or to the notice sender, depending on
who is making the misrepresentation.21
Section 512(h) offers a subpoena process for copyright holders
to get access to the identities of people who are posting
information.22
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id. § 512(g).
Id. § 512(d).
Id. § 512(d)(1)(C).
Id. § 512(f).
Id.
Id. § 512(h).
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So there is the system. It was set up with a vision of massive
amounts of infringing content being posted on Web sites.
Well, it turns out that the massive amounts of infringing
content were posted in people’s homes, on their own personal
machines and not on hosted machines, so the notice provisions for
§ 512(c) that were well articulated for Web hosts really did not
apply.23
That is the legal layout of the land.
Now, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of legal
scholars, including Wendy Seltzer, who led the initiative, became
concerned that the ways in which copyright and other intellectual
property disputes were being mediated very informally and very
rapidly with cease-and-desist letters and they were worried about
the potential free expression issues.24 They set up a database of
cease-and-desist
letters,
called
the
Chilling
Effects
Clearinghouse.25 That has become largely a database of § 512
notices, because there are so many of them being sent. With this
database, two different projects have looked at the results. I am
going to very quickly talk about those and then quickly talk about
the follow-up work I am doing.
The first project was done by Marjorie Heins, a colleague of
mine.26 It basically looked at all of the trademark and copyright,
including § 512, notices from the year 2004 in the Chilling Effects
Database. Many of these were submitted by Google, which
submits all of its notices to the database.
They basically found that the take-home is that twenty-one
percent of all the notices they looked at presented either very weak
23

Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), with, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918–20 (2005).
24
Jennifer Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or ‘Chilling Effects’? Takedown
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006); Wendy Seltzer, Chilling Effects
Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Jan. 18, 2007).
25
See Seltzer, supra note 24.
26
See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WILL FAIR
USE SURVIVE? (2005), http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf.
Marjorie Heins directs the Free Expression Policy Project at the National Coalition
Against Censorship (http://www.fepproject.org).
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initial underlying claims or strong, or reasonably strong, fair use of
free expression or other defenses. Of those notices, about thirtyone out of fifty-four of them—they looked at a set of about 320
notices in total—or thirty-seven percent, ended up being removed
from the Internet. So thirty-seven percent of notices that presented
a strong fair use claim or a reasonable fair use claim or a weak
underlying substantive claim to begin with ended up getting taken
off the Internet.
I point this out because, from First Amendment perspectives, if
you look at this process, it is effectively a prior restraint with no
judicial review, because the § 512(f) standard says, “Hey, if there
is an intentional misrepresentation, you can deal with it.”27 An
intentional misrepresentation is an extremely high standard to
meet. It turns out that § 512(g), the counter-notice provision,28 for
various reasons is rarely used and tends to be fairly ineffective. So
that was the first study.
The second study, which I was working on with Jennifer
Urban, a colleague of mine at USC, came out just a little bit after
that.29 We basically looked at only § 512 notices. We looked at
close to 900 of them, covering a period from 2002 to 2006. We
found somewhat different findings, because we were looking at a
different set of notices.
The fair use findings: we found slightly higher percentages of
fair use and invalid claims and those kinds of things; we found
closer to thirty percent. So I think you can ballpark and say
between twenty and thirty percent of these claims that we were
looking at—which, again, is a particular circumscribed set—were
problematic substantively.
I found a few other things more interesting, in a sense, about
what we found.
One is that § 512(d), the search engine takedown provision,30 is
tremendously popular and it has basically become a tool in the
search engine ranking wars. People are complaining that their
27
28
29
30

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2000).
Id. § 512(g).
See Urban & Quilter, supra note 24.
17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2000).
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metatags are being used, that their short, pithy phrases that
describe this or that product, have been appropriated by somebody
else and are being used and that that other person has ranking.
They are quite explicit about this. They say “and now they have a
number one ranking in Google and I have a number three ranking.”
So they are very unhappy about this.
Another key finding is that fifty-five percent of the search
engine notices related to competitors that were these kinds of
notices—advertising jargon, relatively short phrases—really,
almost all of them were of questionable copyright. But we took a
fairly conservative approach in looking through the fair use on
that. Those notices are increasing. So the § 512(d) notices are the
most popular sorts of notices that are being sent under §§ 512(c)
and (d).
Third, the movie and music industries, and more generally the
creative industries, do not use the §§ 512(c) and (d) processes.31
This is not surprising. The §§ 512(c) and (d) processes are for
Web hosting and Internet search indexing, and the vast majority of
infringements of music and movies are being done on peer-to-peer,
which are § 512(a) processes. So they really don’t have a reason to
use the §§ 512(c) and (d) provisions. They are sending mass
numbers of notices, but they are not “takedown” notices.
Fourth, people who start sending notices keep on sending them,
so half of the notices that we saw were from repeat senders.
Fifth, the procedural flaws in the notices were significant.
Thirty-one percent of the notices presented significant procedural
problems that rendered them technically unenforceable under the
statute. In fact, we discovered later on that the numbers were
actually considerably worse than that, because Google, who had
told us they were submitting all of their notices, actually cleared
out the very worst notices that presented the most substantive flaws
before ever submitting them to Chilling Effects. So we never even
got to see those because they just bounced them back.
We found a number of other areas that we just flagged as
problems. People were sending notices for anti-circumvention
31

Urban & Quilter, supra note 24, at 651.
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claims, which for technical reasons really don’t belong under the
§ 512 process.
The § 512(a) notices were kind of a mess. It turns out that
some § 512(a) providers typically treat repeat allegations as repeat
infringement. This turns out to be very problematic because the
people who are sending all the § 512 notices make numerous
errors.
Let me spend thirty seconds on the work I am doing now,
which is talking to OSPs about what they are doing about this and
how they are treating it. It turns out, not surprisingly, that people
are very confused about these distinctions. If I have gone too fast
for you in this meeting over the categories of service providers,
imagine being a very small service provider or a small educational
institution and trying to figure out what you do with these things.
People do not know, and so they default to treating everything, the
small providers, as a takedown process.
If they have a student who is using a peer-to-peer file-sharing
program, then they just automatically treat that as a takedown.
Now, they cannot take down content, because it is on the student’s
machine, so they disable Internet access. For me, this is a
significant free expression concern—not because I do not take
copyright infringement seriously, but because Internet access is
used for significantly more things than merely infringing
copyright. Internet access is used as perhaps the premier speech
platform for millions—if not billions by now—people in the world,
and cutting it off is a real problem.
I will make two more quick points about what I am finding
now.
The counter-notice process is virtually never used, for various
reasons.
And lastly, rights enforcement companies, this little set of
businesses that have developed in the wake of the DMCA, are a
real problem. They send massive numbers of notices, which a lot
of OSPs describe as virtually like spam. They are worse than
spam, because the OSPs actually have to spend time processing
them, instead of just deleting them.
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And they do not respond to complaints. So if a rights
enforcement company sends a notice to an OSP and the OSP says,
“Hey, I actually don’t even own that IP address”—and this is not
uncommon; OSPs report sometimes receiving forty or fifty such
notices a day—“I do not have that IP address, it is not a server, it
could not possibly hold files,” whatever the reason is, it is
impossible to get back in touch with the companies, because they
just have automatic machines sending those things out. And they
might be staffed by a very small number of people who just do not
bother checking their voicemail or their faxes, apparently.
In conclusion, I would say that copyright is an issue. How it is
being worked out in § 512 is a matter for concern, not from the
copyright perspective, so much as it is from the speech perspective.
I do not think that the process is working very well for the
entertainment industry as well.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Thank you.
Our next speaker is David Carson from the Copyright Office.
MR. CARSON: I am probably going to spend most of my time
talking about another part of the DMCA, § 1201,32 which has more
or less taken over my life in the last few weeks, to the point where
I am probably incapable of talking about anything other than that.
But I will first start with a few general observations about fair use.
I am operating under a handicap, because I first studied
copyright law in 1980, right after the enactment of the 1976
Copyright Act,33 and we started by looking at the actual words of
§ 107,34 which I think is an impediment if you want to understand
what most people think fair use is all about.
It is, of course, a judge-made doctrine, not a statutory
provision. But Congress at least thought that what it was doing in
1976 was codifying that judge-made doctrine.35 Paul did what

32

17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 1541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–803
(2000).
34
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
35
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 94th Cong. (1976) [hereinafter 1976 House Report].
33
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most people do when they looked at that statute—he jumped right
to those four factors, which of course are very, very important.
But what most people seem to do is to ignore the first
paragraph of § 107, which really, I think, sets the scene and sets
the context for what fair use really has always been about. What it
says is, to jump to the heart of it: “[F]air use . . . including such use
by reproduction . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.”36 Then it goes on to list those four
factors.
Now, I was in private practice during the 1980s and a good
deal of the 1990s and I encountered fair use quite a bit. I asserted
fair use quite a bit. I have to say I think every time I encountered
it, either as a proponent or opponent―usually as a proponent, as it
turns out―it was in those contexts of criticism, comment,
scholarship, and research. I would submit that that is really what
the bulk of our history of fair use in this country, going back to
Folsom v. Marsh,37 is all about.
Somewhere along the line, though, between 1976 and today, at
least in the popular conception―but I would submit not in the
conception of the courts for the most part―fair use seems to have
mutated. It has reached a point now where I think for most people
fair use is defined as “anything I want to do with somebody else’s
copyrighted work that I do not think I should be penalized for
doing.”
Now, I may feel this way more than some people do, because I
have for the last year been dealing with rulemaking, which I will
be talking about in a few minutes, where people make arguments
to us about the fair uses they have been unable to engage in and the
reasons they should be able to engage in them and why technology
is imposing impediments and why they should be permitted to
overcome those technological impediments.
The vast majority of the so-called “fair uses” that I have seen
people tell us that they ought to be able to engage in are uses that I
36
37

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
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would call uses for purposes of private copying―“I bought a
legitimate copy of this work. I want to make additional copies for
myself. I want to be able to listen to the music in my car. I want
to be able to see the movie at my vacation home or on my yacht.”
We can all sympathize with that, right? Or “I want to give it to a
friend or a bunch of my friends―as a gift, of course; I am not
going to get any money for it. So that’s a fair use, right?”
Well, I would say no, no way, not even close. That has nothing
to do with fair use, and fair use historically has never had anything
to do with that.
Now, of course, the first thing you hear from folks, and the first
thing I read in submissions from many folks about this is, “Well,
wait a minute. That is what the Supreme Court told us in 1984, in
the Sony v. Universal case, the Betamax case38 that private copying
is all right.”
That is not what the Supreme Court told us, of course. What
the Supreme Court told us was that time-shifting of on-the-air,
publicly broadcast television programs, so that if you miss the
show at eight o’clock you can watch it at nine o’clock or the next
day or next Tuesday and then get rid of it, is fair use.39 The Court
expressly did not talk about making your own personal copy to
keep.40 I do not think any court has ever talked about that, and it
certainly has not said it is fair use.
But that seems to be the popular conception, and that is
something that I think needs to be dispelled. But it is in the air and
it is hard to dispel. Fortunately, as I said, there is precious little
legal authority for the proposition, but plenty of people seem to
believe it.
Now, fair use is, of course, as the Supreme Court said, and as
Congress said in its legislative history for the 1976 Act, an
equitable rule of reason; it is not something you apply rigidly.41
38

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id. at 455 (holding that “home time shifting is fair use”).
40
Compare id. at 458–59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (indicating that video library
building is an issue), with id. at 421 (summarizing the majority analysis without
mentioning library building).
41
See 1976 House Report, supra note 35; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 577–79 (1994).
39
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You cannot read § 107 and say, “Okay, I know what it is. It is
clearly outlined. We know what we can do. We know what we
can’t do.” There is, I will grant, some degree of subjectivity. You
get any two copyright lawyers together―experienced, reasonable
copyright lawyers―and present them with a particular scenario,
and there is a good chance that they will disagree with respect to
whether what is happening is or is not fair use. I have those
debates all the time.
One thing we hear in the debate over fair use is, “Is it a good
thing or is it a bad thing that fair use isn’t a black-and-white
matter?” As a lawyer, and as someone who finds copyright to be a
really interesting area of law, I would submit it is a really good
thing. To me it is the most fascinating part of copyright law, really
getting your teeth into a fair use issue and trying to figure out
whether a particular use is or isn’t fair, and going through all the
arguments pro and con.
But the counterargument to that is: How do people out there in
the real world who want to figure out “can I do this or can’t I do
this?” govern themselves? They go to a copyright lawyer, and the
copyright lawyer will tell them, “On the one hand, yes; on the
other hand, no; and the answer is maybe.” That is a real problem,
and I do not have the answer.
One answer that is proposed is let’s codify it in much more
detail, which is what a lot of other systems, such as civil law
systems, do.42 They tell you precisely what you can and cannot do,
usually in a much less generous fashion than I think our courts
have done when they have considered fair use on a case-by-case
basis.
But I take the point that if you are not a copyright expert―and
even if you are a copyright expert―you do not necessarily have
assurance in a given case as to whether something is or is not fair
use.
So that is the overview of where I come from when I look at
fair use. But let’s talk about what I have been focusing on
recently, and that is a rulemaking proceeding that the Digital
42

See, e.g., Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle [C. PROP. INT.] (FR.).
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Millennium Copyright Act delegated to the Register of Copyrights
and the Librarian of Congress.
The rulemaking relates to the provision in § 1201(a)(1), which
was added by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.43 The basic
provision in § 1201 is: “No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title.”44
So, to take the most well-known access control, when you buy
a DVD of a popular motion picture, it is going to have something
called CSS, the Content Scrambling System, on it. CSS is an
access control. It is an access control in that you can only play that
DVD on a DVD player that has been licensed to play that DVD.
The people who license the DVD players make sure that anyone
who operates under that license cannot have a digital output from
that machine that is playing the DVD, the whole notion being we
want to prevent people from making unlawful copies. It is an
access control in that it controls your access. You can only access
the content on the DVD by putting it in an authorized player.
Access controls can be other things too. Password protection is
an access control. If you are able to break through the password
protection on, say, a Web site that is only open to subscribers, you
are violating § 1201(a)(1).45
But as the DMCA was going through Congress, the original
version just had that prohibition, flat out; that was it. When it got
to the Commerce Committee, which considered itself at that point
the protector or champion of fair use—which is interesting,
because the provision came out of the Judiciary Committee, which
is typically considered the committee that thinks about
copyright―the Commerce Committee said: “Wait a minute. Well
and good, we understand why copyright owners need to do this.
We understand the need to give them some legal teeth behind the
technological measures that they are deploying. But what happens
if everything gets locked up? What happens if people are not able
to engage in what are clearly non-infringing activities because
43
44
45

17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
Id.
See id.
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there are these technological measures applied to their works and
people can’t do what in the old-fashioned hardcopy world they
always could do? I can pick up a book from the library shelf and
read it; I can’t pick up a CD and read it.”
In particular, the Commerce Committee was concerned about
fair use.
Because of that, they tasked the Secretary of
Commerce―but by the time it got out of Congress it was the
Librarian of Congress, on the recommendation of the Register of
Copyrights―who had the task of conducting a rulemaking
proceeding every three years to determine whether there are any
particular classes of works with respect to which the ability of
users to engage in non-infringing uses is being adversely affected
by the prohibition on circumvention of technological measures that
control access.46 None of you understand what I just said. If you
do, you are very bright, because it took me a long time to digest it
and figure out what it meant.
What it means basically is that if we find, based upon what is
happening out there in the real world, that technological measures,
access controls, are being deployed on works in a way that is
actually preventing people from engaging in non-infringing uses,
we may exempt the classes of works with respect to which those
technological measures are being deployed.
With respect to DVDs for example, we can say, “Fine, motion
pictures on DVDs are exempt. People who are engaging in noninfringing uses may break through CSS if we find that the facts
warrant that.” So far we haven’t in two rulemakings. We are in
our third now, and within the last twenty-four hours the Register of
Copyrights has completed her recommendation, and the Librarian
of Congress may well, as early as next week, make his final
conclusion based upon those recommendations. You may see the
announcement as early as the Monday after Thanksgiving.
What kinds of fair uses have we found? Well, I’ll just mention
a couple that we found, and I may talk about, if I have time, how

46

See id. § 1201 (a)(1)(c); see also The Register of Copyrights: Before the Committee
on House Appropriations, 2005 WL 1222535 (F.D.C.H.) (statement of MaryBeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights).
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our approach may actually be changing this year in some
interesting ways.
One of the things that we have done―we did it in 2000,47 and
we did it in 200348―related to situations having to do with
software that you can put on your computer to prevent your
children from going to sites on the Internet that you may not want
them to go to. We exempted a class consisting of “compilations
consisting of lists of Internet locations blocked by commercially
marketed filtering software applications that are intended to
prevent access to domains, websites, or portions of websites.”49
That’s the main thing. We teased it out a little bit with some
details, but that’s the essential language of the exempted class.
We learned that filtering software that prevents you from going
to websites that the people who sell that filtering software think are
inappropriate for children, for example, has been subject to a lot of
criticism. Critics, since it has first been deployed, have argued that
it over-protects, it keeps you from going to websites that anyone
should be able to go to. How can you critique that software if you
do not know what it is that the software is preventing you from
going to, because it is in a list that is encrypted? You’ve got to
break through that encryption to get to it.
We considered this to be classic fair use. You should be able
to get access to those lists if what you are doing is critiquing the
software so you can tell whether it is doing the job well or poorly,
advise consumers whether it is a good thing to buy or a bad thing
to buy. If the only way to do that is to break through the
encryption, then so be it, you can do that. So we found there was a
fair use, we found the case had been made, and we issued the
exemption.
My time is up, so maybe in the discussion, if people want to go
there, I can talk a little bit more about this year’s rulemaking.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Next we will hear from John Palfrey
from The Berkman Center.

47
48
49

37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2000).
37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2003).
Id. For the text of the current regulation, see 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2006).
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MR. PALFREY: Sonia, thank you so much.
I am sorry to say I am going to use the crutch of digital
technology here. Everybody else has so brilliantly avoided doing
that. So brilliant, in fact, is my colleague Professor Hansen down
there on the end, that he does not need a presentation, because he
always puts himself at the end and then writes his presentation
while others are talking, which is quite extraordinary. I have
absolutely no hope of accomplishing that.
Thank you to Sonia and the student organizers. This is an
extraordinary forum and I am delighted to have been invited.
[Slide] I come from a little research center at the Havard Law
School, called The Berkman Center for Internet and Society. It has
been referred to relatively recently, once in The New York Times
Magazine, as “the intellectual hub of the Copy Left.”50 I also saw
a blog post the other day that called us “The Berkman Center for
Copyhate”51―that was a new one.
I am ordinarily in the pose of saying that fair use, a very strong
sense of fair use, broad sense of fair use, is a great thing. In order
just to be slightly provocative, and given that there is rethinking
and redefining the boundaries as our title, I wanted to actually look
a little bit at the extent to which there are limits to fair use, and to
do so by kind of fast-forwarding into the world of Web 2.0, or the
user-generated content space.
Everybody may have seen the transaction of Google buying
YouTube for $1.65 billion. Much of the discussion in the wake of
that transaction, of course, was: Is there a copyright problem
underlying YouTube; is Google buying itself a whole lot of
lawsuits? We heard about the “tolerated use” line from Tim Wu,52
which is a great one. There are lots of rumors as to whether or not
they reserved a whole bunch of money to pay off the copyright
holders. Certainly, the first thing they did was to sign up deals

50

Robert S. Boynton, The Tryanny of Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 25,
2004.
51
Christian L. Castle, Anybody, anybody . . . , MUSIC TECH. POLICY, Sept. 24, 2006,
http://music-tech-policy.blogspot.com/2006/09/anybody-anybody.html.
52
See Wu, supra note 5.
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with Warner Music, and they are now going over to the movie
industry.
But what I wanted to talk about actually is, what about the
other stuff in the YouTube zone, or in the Web at large, that is
created by users that might use some of this stuff, or be reused by
other users in contexts, which don’t touch on the rights that Warner
in the music context or the movie industry might also have?
So I am thinking about the Web 2.0 stuff that you think of as
truly user-generated content and the extent to which fair use is
really important in this context. People reuse other people’s stuff
all the time, re-aggregating it, but do so in a way that is not
particularly clearly described.
A big phenomenon. Everybody who has children in the age of
zero to twenty or so understands this. But there is a sense of this
generation being slightly different in the way that they use digital
technologies. Think of it as digital natives, people who are born
digital, as opposed to those of us who came to be digital.
[Slide] One of the huge things that digital natives do, of
course, is participate in this citizen-generated media space.
How many people here blog? [Show of hands]
That’s pretty good actually. Maybe twenty-five percent.
Any podcasters? Anybody create audio? [Show of hands]
People who create videos, who post to YouTube or anything
like that? [Show of hands] A couple people.
So fewer going down the line, but I think it is clearly a trend in
terms of people creating more and more their own content. I
would stipulate that digital natives are doing this a lot.
Likewise, people are sharing and creating together, Wikipedia
being the clearest example of this.53 Wiki as a productivity tool of
digital natives is well known.
And then, lots of people re-aggregating other people’s content,
so finding what is the best of the digital natives’ content that they
have created in the Web 2.0 space and then re-aggregating it.
53
Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org. “Wikipedia is an encyclopedia collaboratively
written by many of its readers.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Introduction.
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This ties, of course, very closely to the creation of digital
identity. It is a problem that does not exactly bear on the copyright
space, but think about a young person who is creating the way that
they are found on the Web. For a lot of the time, it is the creativity
that they are making, which is then sort of mashed up into a
MySpace page or a Facebook page.54
Of course, many of the things that are being used and
commented on are digital media; they are things that have come
out of the space that is copyright holders.
Critically important to this is the Web 2.0 technology layer.
Think about the kind of creativity here that young people are
doing. It is often a mash-up; it is often using technologies that let
you mash lots of different bits of digital things. And think about
sort of art as collage. This is a different way of thinking about
what it means to create something. But it is something that also
has in its way some problems in the copyright context.
One of the good parts of this, of course, is that there are new
contexts and new meaning that are being created. Scholars like
Jack Balkin at Yale,55 Yochai Benckler also at Yale,56 and Terry
Fisher at Harvard,57 have talked a lot about this creation of
semiotic democracy, the ability to tell your own story, and to do so
often in international contexts or cross-cultural contexts.
So I think that the dominant thrust here is consumers, young
consumers, becoming creators in this space. So think about the
world of authors, expanding substantially who is in fact an author,
and creating these smaller works in digital form on the Web, but
then with the mode of creativity in fact being to mash them up, but
not having sort of a massive rights clearance layer there.
To me this presents an issue for copyright. That is what I
would call the primary threat of this movement in the intellectual
54

http://www.myspace.com; http://www.facebook.com. MySpace and Facebook are
online communities in which users create their own “home pages.”
55
Jack Balkin, Digital Speed and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004).
56
Yochai Benckler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of
Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2003).
57
William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1203 (1998).

PANEL_III_FORMATTED_050807

2007

5/8/2007 1:04:06 PM

COPYRIGHT PANEL: FAIR USE

1041

property zone. There are a bunch of arguments about this, why it
might not be an issue.
One argument is people do not really want to get paid. People
who put their works on YouTube, you presume they put it out
there and then the people who created YouTube sold it for
$1 billion. You didn’t ask for any money. Most bloggers don’t
ask for any money. But, increasingly, some bloggers are hoping to
get some.
Argument number two—saying this is not a big problem—
there is an implied license. You put it out on the Internet and
somebody will reuse it in various ways, but you are implying that
they can. In the really simple syndication space, which is the mode
of aggregating Web blogs and replaying them, this is a dominant
argument, which says: If you put something out there on a blog
and you put it in an XML format that lets other people re-aggregate
it, of course you are implying that they can use it. Now, I am not
sure that is sustainable, but it is clearly one of the arguments.
The last one is that you go to fair use. You take the argument
that says: It might be somebody else’s copyright―of course it is;
in digital space it is no different than in the offline space―but then
fair use exempts all of these mash-ups.
But against that backdrop there is almost no licensing of usergenerated content. The only licensing that goes on is Creative
Commons licenses.58 These are licenses that are created by a
nonprofit organization that people put onto their user-generated
content. There are 140 million objects with Creative Commons
licenses on them. But these are licenses that are used on only a
small fraction of what is out there in the user-generated content
space.
[Slide] This is presenting issues. If I had access to the
Internet, I would click on this page and show you a post from a
venture capitalist who invests in this space. One of the things that
many of the people putting capital into Web 2.0 are concerned
about is that billions of dollars are going into building this layer of
technologies, but it is on sand, and there is a copyright problem
58

See Creative Commons, http://www.creativecommons.org.
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lurking at the core of it, which are these rights problems that we
have seen show up in YouTube. So the Silicon Valley people, who
we do not have to worry about―they have lots of yachts and so
forth―are putting money into an emerging and important space,
trying to reach these digital natives, but they are going to lose it all
because there is going to be a copyright train wreck at the end of it.
There is also, of course, the issue that copyright links up in this
context frequently to trademark―people are inventing things that
have trademarks.
But also, importantly, privacy. Go back to that digital identity
concern, which is if you are wrapping into your user-generated
creation, you might well in fact be taking what is increasingly the
digital identity of people who initially posted it, but without any
either compensation or licensing.
[Slide] So takeaways of this rapid tour through the world of
digital natives:
The version of the Web that is called Web 2.0, or usergenerated media and so forth, is about creativity at the edges.
Stipulate that lots and lots of people are creating Web blogs and so
forth―65 million by one count, 35 million in China, and growing
very quickly around the world. So there is lots to be happy about
in the user-generated content space.
But here are some problems.
One problem is it is complicated for traditional media
companies, traditional authors and creators, to participate in this
because there is not a whole lot of a sense of “Okay, if I go out into
this wild world of user-generated content and try to bring it into,
say, thewashingtonpost.com, which they do very effectively,59 do
you pay the author whose stuff you brought in? If you are a large
media company that is trying to get hip to what people are saying
and to build it into the videos and so forth that you are posting on
the Web, do you go clear those rights? How do you participate in
59

Registered users of thewashingtonpost.com can submit comments on site articles, blogs,
and reviews. See washingtonpost.com Discussion Guidelines, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/liveonline/delphi/delphirules.htm. In addition, The Washington Post’s
rewards program awards points for posting user content online. See The Washington Post
PostPoints, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/registration/postpoints/marketing.html.
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this world, which is extremely informal, and with creative
comments licenses, at best?”
One of the key ways that this content is shared is through
syndication. Again, sort of a longer story, but there are
technologies, RSS60 being the key one, that have the ability to
syndicate little bits of content across the Web and then reaggregate them. I think there is a looming crisis in the mode of
syndication because of the lack of clarity that is there.
I think substantially fair use is a part of the answer here. It is
critically important that I not suggest that fair use ought to be
curtailed or that fair use is insufficient in its ability to protect much
of this use. But I do not think it does solve this extremely informal
process of reusing and creating entirely.
So what are some answers to it?
One is to say if everybody used a Creative Commons license,
or some other license, when they were a user, creating one of these
millions and millions and millions of digital things, and then you
were to have a system where we all recognize those rights and
reuse them accordingly—maybe technology in a DRM-style way,
in fact, would recognize these licenses and allow you to recreate
them or not—that is one possibility.
Perhaps you could also put a layer on top of it. Imagine the
Copyright Clearance Center, but one that, in fact, is done for usergenerated content in a micro-payment way.
Another possibility that some scholars have suggested in this
zone is, of course, compulsory licensing, which is to say could we
set up a system for all this informal stuff that is on the Web,
consider it compulsorily licensed out to the world? How would
you manage the payment? I think that is a complicated issue.
Another variant of that could be, of course, that you just clear
all of this stuff to be in some sort of a public domain. I think that
is relatively farfetched.
Another example would be one that Laura and others have
worked on extensively, which is what are the best practices here
60

Really Simple Syndication, a file format for web feeds.
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for doing it, and try to get a better user understanding of what, in
fact, are the best practices for reusing somebody else’s content,
and, through education and better understanding, hope that that, in
fact, may help to solve the problem.
With forty-five seconds left here, I might cede, but say that fair
use is hugely helpful in this crisis, may in fact help avert much of
it, but may not be the entire answer.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Thank you.
Last, Hugh Hansen.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: John, that was a trade secret, by the
way.
MR. PALFREY: Sorry about that. It is on the record. It will
be in the Journal.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Yes, it will be in the Journal.
MR. PALFREY: They will put the “brilliant” part in there too,
though, I think.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you. Well, I usually insert
that anyway.
We are addressing the role of fair use.61 To understand that
role, I think we have to examine what role copyright plays.
It is common to say that copyright is a monopoly or limited
monopoly. Paul Aiken is, of course, right to challenge that
language. But I would not even concede that it is a weak
monopoly. A monopoly is driven by market share and entails the
ability to restrict output or control prices.62 Some say that it is a
“legal monopoly,” distinguishing it from an economic monopoly.
I do not understand this use of “monopoly” other than to avoid
saying that copyright is a property right.

61

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (definition of “monopoly”). The legal
protection that copyright law provides does not accomplish anything in the market place
other than the prevention of copying. Copyright is a nothing more than a property right,
and a limited property right at that.
62
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Some say that copyright law is a liability or a regulatory
scheme in an effort, I assume, to avoid the consequences of having
to defend the taking someone else’s property. But, the courts and
Congress have consistently treated copyright as property—a
bundle of rights protecting some thing or a “res,” to use the Latin.
To understand what courts and Congress have done it is helpful
to look at Locke and his so-called labor theory of property: Under
that theory, as we all know, one’s effort creates a natural law
property right.63 Locke is not in fashion today to say the least. He
is viewed as too extreme. But, Locke did recognize limits to the
theory. If there is not enough raw material around, effort with
regard to the limited raw material does not give any one person a
property right.
This recognition of the need in certain
circumstances to share or limit property interests also takes place
in copyright law. We see it with regard to, inter alia, the ideaexpresson dichotomy, the exceptions to bundle of rights contained
in § 106, and, of course, fair use. This balancing to date, however,
has normally occurred with the thumb down on the property side
of the scale.
If you do not think of copyright in the above-stated property
sense, you are going to scratch your head and wonder why we get
the results we get both in Congress and the courts. It might be that
in the future this approach will change to something closer to what
the Copy Left desire and advocate. But right now, anyway, most
courts, jurors and the legislatures, treat copyright as it is a property
right with some limited balancing.
So with the current role of copyright in mind, what role does
fair use have? Historically, it has been a method to sort out the
equities when the defendant’s use does not threaten the mainstream
revenue stream of the copyright owner. It focuses on a particular
copyright owner and a particular user or copier. It is an ad hoc or
micro approach. As Justice Souter stated in Acuff-Rose, the “task
is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”64 Even the
minimalist bright-line rule that fair use is an affirmative defense,
63
64

See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ch. V (1690).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).

PANEL_III_FORMATTED_050807

1046

5/8/2007 1:04:06 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:1017

while often stated in the doctrinal introduction in the beginning of
an opinon, is ignored in the reasoning that follows later. Likewise
the Copy Left view of fair use as a right carries no weight to date
in courts’ very ad hoc determinations.
John Palfrey earlier walked us through alternatives to fair use
that might be coming with regard to specific factual scenarios. I
agree with John that we must find a way to allow user-generated
creativity to flourish and to make it widely available. Actually, I
think John was quite balanced in his appraisal and suggestions. He
invariably is. Wherever people put the the Berkman Center on the
Copyright-Copy Left spectrum, John is too balanced and
reasonable to be considered hard-core Copy Left.
In short, fair use is best viewed historically as a tool on a case
by case basis to decide in close cases who should win. Courts have
been careful to produce no sweeping generalizations. Nor do
courts look to previous results in their analysis. While a court
might cite doctrinal statements on fair use from past cases, the
particular applications of the doctrine cited as applied to the facts
in those past cases are neither analyzed nor applied to produce the
results in the current case. It is similar in that regard to
determining “substantial similarity” or “likelihood of confusion” in
trademark cases. Courts have desired flexibility in intellectual
property cases, and these doctrines have been created to provide
that flexibility.
Nevertheless, there are some patterns one can look to in
determining whether there is a fair use or not. Of the four fair use
factors, the second (“the nature of the copyrighted work”) plays no
real part today. The third factor (“amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”) was
once important but has much less impact since the reprography
revolution. The first factor (“the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes”) is important as it looks at the
conduct of the defendant. Not much weight is placed on whether
or not the work is commercial and if the work is nonprofit, it does
not matter much whether it is for educational purposes or not.
There is still some weight given to how much of the defendant’s
work consists of simply copying the plaintiff’s work. What
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percentage of the defendant’s work was simply copied from the
plaintiff’s? That question still has some importance today. Courts
often mistakenly place this analysis into the third factor, which is
designed to focus only on what percentage of the plaintiff’s work
was taken, not how it was used.65 Also, transformative uses come
into play here.
The fourth factor (“the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work”)66 is the most
important.67 Justice Souter stated in Acuff-Rose “[m]arket harm is
a matter of degree, and the importance of this factor will vary, not
only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of
the showing on the other factors.”68 I think the reality is that a
demonstration of harm makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to
find fair use, as Souter had indicated earlier in the opinion in AcuffRose.69 Where there is only potential harm to a market, fair use
might have a chance if the first factor is strong in defendant’s
favor, but where there is demonstrated actual harm, there is
currently no chance. This, of course, is consistent with a property
right analysis.
Even if fair use were just more sophisticated way to judge who
is the good guy or bad guy, it clearly demonstrates that defendants
do not always lose. In fact, sometimes it is so clear that a
defendant should prevail that courts do not even take the time to go
through a fair use analysis and simply use the de minimis doctrine.
Another indication of the courts’ increasing view that plaintiffs’
copyright actions might be without merit is the expanded use of
summary judgment for defendants. This is in the face of strong
language by Judge Jerome Frank in Arnstein v. Porter back in
1946 that summary judgment in a copyright case is not generally
appropriate because of the ability of plaintiff’s case to develop at
trial with cross-examination of the defendant, etc. Frank, with
65

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
67
See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)
(noting that the “last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use”).
68
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 591 n.21 (1994).
69
Id. at 591 (defendant “would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating
fair use without favorable evidence about relevant markets”).
66
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Judge Learned Hand concurring, strongly reaffirmed Second
Circuit language that summary judgment should not be granted
where “there is the slightest doubt about the facts.”70 Courts today,
particularly the Second Circuit, recognizing the waste of judicial
resources and unfairness to defendants today follow the more
sympathetic view of summary judgment of Judge Clark’s in
dissent in that case.71
So where is fair use going in the future? I am firm believer in
the value of copyright but also in the need for proper fair use
analysis. To make sure fair use has a role to play at three things
are necessary: (1) policy not doctrine controls cases; (2) users need
to resist copyright industries’ culture of requiring licenses for
every use including fair uses; and (3) resources need to be made
available to users to resist that culture wherever it is found.
1) Policy, Not Doctrine, Controls Cases
I need not to go into a whole legal realist spiel here. It is
enough to remember that fair use was made out of whole cloth by
the courts beginning with Justice Story in Folsom.72 Fair use is
simply a doctrinal vehicle for courts to do what they want in a
particular case. By emphasizing the ad hoc nature of fair use
courts have demonstrated their lack of concern for precedents. But
even if that were not the case, courts have written opinions that
would not bind them to any particular result in the future. This is
true, for instance, of Justice Souter’s opinion in Acuff-Rose which
makes comments on both sides of each fair use issue it analyzes. It
is also true of his opinion in Grokster. When you take into account
all the issues that have been reserved and the dicta, the Court is
pretty much free to do anything it wants in the next P2P case.
Despite my best efforts, many people thought that the result in
Grokster was going to be controlled by Sony. (Many of them owe
70

Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir 1946).
Id. at 480 (copyright “suits are not excepted from F.R. 56; and often that seems the
most useful and direct procedure”). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 256–57 (1986) (rejecting an argument that “defendant should seldom if ever be
granted summary judgment” and requiring that “plaintiff must present affirmative
evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion of summary judgment”).
72
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841).
71
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me dinner now, by the way.) Justice Scalia during the oral
argument in Grokster commented to Grokster’s attorney, “[t]his
Court is certainly not going to decide this case on the basis of stare
decisis, you know, whatever else is true.”73 I imagine Grokster’s
attorney was taken aback by that statement.
MR. PALFREY: Is it a joke?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: No, he was serious.
And as David Carson said, the actual words of § 107 have not
really controlled outcomes.74 So doctrine by way of precedents or
statutory language is not controlling. The key, therefore, is to
make convincing policy arguments as to what should be done
without forgetting the basic importance of gut instinct, good
guy/bad guy conclusions. So do not look at the Supreme Court’s
words, most of which were written by clerks and not by the
Justices themselves, in any case, or statutory language. Do not
parse their opinions or those of any other courts as if they came
down like the Ten Commandments, because the courts are not
going to do that.
So what is a concrete example of what should be done in a fair
use case? Let’s take the real world example of the Google book
library project.75 Google needs to emphasize its opt-out provision
and not back away from it in litigation. Critics of the book project
say that copyright has never embraced an opt-out approach. My
answer is, “So what?” An incredible project that perhaps only
Google could attempt with great public benefit will be thwarted
because publishers insist that Google say, “Pretty please, may I?”
Critics say that it will set a bad precedent. Well, as we
have discussed fair use is ad hoc and no court need allow opt-outs
in other cases based upon the result in this case. The facts in
Google make it sui generis ab initio. But Google might go
beyond that and argue that opt-out, at least in some

73
Transcript of Record at 41, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 480).
74
See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (Carson comments).
75
For a full description of the Google Book Project, see Melanie Costantino, Note,
Fairly Used: Why Google’s Book Project Should Prevail under the Fair Use Defense,
17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 235 (2006).
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circumstances, in not a bad thing but sometimes can easily and
properly balance the interests of those involved. I have been told
by lawyers on Google side that the opt-out provision is “nice” but
not legally relevant in a fair use analysis. That type of statement
make me, a legal realist, cringe. Everything is relevant in all cases
if it can influence the court, especially in the judge-made rule-ofreason, fair use. Moreover, there is doctrine right on point. Optout is part of the first factor, “the nature and character of
[defendant’s] use of [plaintiff’s work].”
What about the good guy/bad guy analysis?
This case reeks of good guy/bad guy arguments. For the
publishers, Google is the capitalist spawn of satan, not caring about
anyone or the law, running roughshod over publishers who scratch
out a living working for the public good. In fact, Google better
watch how it acts and is perceived. Whatever the merits of its
copyright law arguments, if courts buy into even some of this
characterization, it will make it much harder if not impossible to
win.
What can Google do on the factual aspects of the good guy/bad
guy issue? First, do not think it is irrelevant to the case. Second,
try hard to demonstrate it is a good copyright citizen in other
contexts. For instance, do not just announce a licensing program
for YouTube, but be reasonable and try hard to make it happen.
Try donating to charitable organizations rather than just looking
for nonprofit investment opportunities. Sponsoring the Fordham
Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law &
Policy would be a very good start.
What can Google do with policy/legal analyses concerning the
claim that it is a bad guy? It should, while denying the factual
truth of the allegations, of course, make use of the bad guy
characterizations as a reflection on the merits of the case. Google
is being singled out not because of the copyright merits, but
because of publishers views about Google and perhaps free market
capitalism. What the publishers fear is changes in the status quo
over which they have no control. (Not an unusual human
perspective.) But rather than opt out to gain control or find other
ways to deal with those fears, they choose instead to kill a project
that will help many if not all in their industry: publishers and
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authors alike; not to mention the public. Publishers are interested
in their own power, which frankly has been misused to the
disadvantage of many authors over the years. That they are not
acting upon the copyright merits is illustrated by their failure to sue
the libraries involved in the Google book project, without whom
the project would fail. Why do they not sue them? Because the
libraries are good guys. If the Library of Congress had come up
with this project, there would have been praise not a lawsuit. The
public is going to lose a wonderful project because the publishers
are going after an outsider who is actually helping them but who
has not shown proper respect and deference, and who frightens
them.
On the publishers’ side, they could do worse than address what
really frightens them, and others as well. Google, I think, frightens
people because it is not subject to the same constraints as other
people and organizations. This is true in part because of its
overwhelming market success, resulting commercial power,
continuing ability to innovate and succeed, lack of concern for the
views of others or need to consider the views of others, and the
digital zeitgeist, religion, or philosophy it embraces. In a sentence,
Google’s philosophy might be described as “today the book
project, tomorrow the world.”
Back to Google’s arguments.
What about arguments
concerning the very important fair use fourth factor: harm to
markets and potential markets?76 The claim that the book project
will harm the publishers seems like a manufactured argument. It is
not clear how Google’s project will hurt the publishers other than
they will not get royalties from Google’s use. But lack of royalties
from fair use claimants is true with regard to every fair use claim.
What about harm to the publishers’ competing databases? That
also seems contrived. The reality is that there will be no
competing databases. All other book databases will be niche
submarkets that should be helped by Google’s all inclusive
database market. Moreover, if there is harm, all they have to do to
stop it is to write a letter to Google opting out. If writing a letter is
too much effort, there cannot be much harm.
76

17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
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Most of the above analysis and arguments are non-doctrinal. It
is the non-doctrinal policy and good guy/bad guy arguments,
however, that convince or at least influence courts. If you think
doctrine and stare decisis control, speak with Justice Scalia. Fair
use advocates and opponents need to make these types of
arguments. If you stick to doctrine, the Courts will go on by
themselves to figure out the correct policies, or worse, will do so
with the help of your opponents.
2) User Must Resist Copyright Industries’ Culture of Requiring
Licenses for Every Use Including Fair Uses
The first problem with this culture is that the industry is
overreaching and claiming protection where it does not exist.
Laura Quilter has demonstrated this to be the case as well in the
DMCA context.77 The second problem is that in the commercial
context it produces people who pay fees rather than fighting in
court to demonstrate fair use. This is a perfectly reasonable
position for businesses as it is much easier and cheaper to pay than
to former. Nevertheless, it needs to be resisted because when
courts find an industry culture of payments, they will more easily
conclude that defendants’ non-authorized uses cause economic
harm, the lack of customary fees for use. I think this influenced
Judge Newman in Ringgold, a case, if fees had not been paid to the
plaintiff for the same types of use, that probably would have gone
the other way.78 It also influenced Justice O’Connor’s definition
of commercial use in Harper & Row.79
3) Resources Need to Be Made Available to Users to Resist
Industry Cultures of Requiring Licenses for All Uses Including
Fair Use
We need resources to be made available to enable users to
resist these demands. Perhaps one or two test litigations on behalf
of documentary filmmakers, for instance, would do the trick.

77
78
79

See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text (Quilter comments).
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 1997).
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 606 (1985).
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I think fair use, the law, is okay for the most part, and I think it
can work. The problem is that people cannot avail themselves of
its protection.
What did we do when people could not afford to take
advantage of criminal defenses or protections such as the Fourth
Amendment? We provided them with lawyers. We also provided
lawyers in civil contexts. We have to think about supplying
lawyers for people stuck in a user position in which they have a
legitimate fair use defense but cannot afford to litigate it.
Now Fordham is thinking of having an IP clinic. It costs a lot
of money. I am going to ask you to contribute at the end of this
session. In fact, the doors are locked, so don’t try to escape.
The key, I do not think, is changing the law. I think the key is
giving economic power to the other side so the full aspects of fair
use can be litigated.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Thank you. As always, the diamond
in the crown of Fordham Law School.
Before we actually start―and we have a fair amount of time to
talk about questions―I just want to ask the panelists whether they
want to take a minute or so to respond to some of the things that
have been said, and then we will go directly to questions. Does
anyone want to respond?
MS. QUILTER: I will jump in with a quick comment.
The informality that John was discussing, which may be
leading us to a copyright train wreck, I actually want to hold that
out as a positive, because it has enabled a tremendous amount of
free expression. People really do not want to have to go see a
lawyer; they do not want to have to think about licensing; they
really just want to put their content out in the world, they really
want to communicate, they really want to talk and share
information. That has created the Internet. The Internet was not
created by a bunch of lawyers who were saying, “Well, before you
start posting this, you really want to make sure you’ve got your IP
rights worked out,” and da da da.
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I think it is actually proving to be a tremendous boon for
creators in every walk of life, including new creators who we never
envisioned before. There are definitely a lot of problems as we are
working our way through that, and adjustments as people are
negotiating values from one media and trying to work out how
they exchange information in the other media.
But while we are looking at the potential train wrecks, I would
actually like to put in a voice for informality and not lawyering-up
in every aspect of life. I think that is a positive, affirmative value.
To the extent that fair use helps us keep things informal and
flexible and loose, then I think that is a really useful role for fair
use. If we do not have fair use to do it, maybe de minimis, maybe
something else. But I think it is an incredibly valuable thing.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I agree.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Anyone else?
MR. AIKEN: I would like to comment on a couple things.
Regarding the Web 2.0 issues that John brought up,80 a lot of
this can be handled through implied license. An implied license is
how most search engines work. When you put something on the
Internet and you know there are search engines out there and you
do not put the blocking tag on, there is, in my view, an implied
license to make it available in these search engines. I think that
has a big role.
I think also the Creative Commons license is a great thing. As
long as people are fully aware of what rights they are giving up
and they realize it is a real license, in many cases irrevocable, as
long as they know what they are doing, it’s a powerful tool and
should be used by people who are interested in participating in
various mash-ups and collages online.
Regarding Professor Hansen’s talk,81 I would agree with a lot
of what he said, with one big exception. I think that fair use
basically works. The problem is there often are not enough legal
resources on the side of the creator who wants to make fair use.

80
81

See supra notes 50–60 and accompanying text (Palfrey comments).
See supra notes 61–79 and accompanying text (Hansen comments).

PANEL_III_FORMATTED_050807

2007

5/8/2007 1:04:06 PM

COPYRIGHT PANEL: FAIR USE

1055

Authors all the time want to make fair use of things. They
come to our offices asking what is allowed, what is permitted. All
we can tell them is what the industry practice is and say, “This is
no guarantee. You will have to give it your best shot and we will
stand behind you the best way we can if this is ever litigated.” But
we are a nonprofit, and there are limits to how much we can stand
behind someone.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Great, thank you.
Let’s actually take a few questions. We have microphones in
the back. If you would just identify yourself before you ask.
Otherwise I will start calling on people.
QUESTION: Hi. Susan Scafidi, visiting here at Fordham Law
School and ordinarily at SMU in Dallas.82
I wanted to thank the panel. It was fabulous.
I would like to turn the panel’s attention a little bit back to the
question or the concern that Laura raised, the concern about ceaseand-desist letters being overused, essentially.
I have two
questions.
The micro question, Laura, is one of methodology. That is to
say, David and Hugh both pointed out that it is really tough to
determine whether or not something is fair use, and we see that
flip-flopping in the courts.83 So when we have twenty-one percent
or thirty percent of cases that you all determine are either weak
copyright cases, weak infringement cases, or strong fair use
defenses,84 how exactly do you go about determining that, given
the uncertainty of the doctrine? I know you have a wonderful
methodology. I would just like to hear it unpacked a little bit
more.
The meta question, again going to the panel, is how to solve
this. It is frightening to get a cease-and-desist letter. I am
certainly not a digital native. I speak with an accent. I am terrified
82
See Justin Hughes et. al, Panel II: That’s a Fine Chablis You’re Not Drinking: The
Proper Place for Geographical Indications in Trademark Law, 17 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 933 (2007) (Susan Scafidi presentation).
83
See supra notes 32–49 and accompanying text (Carson comments); supra notes 61–
79 and accompanying text (Hansen comments).
84
See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text (Quilter comments).
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when I get them. I usually bare my teeth and send back a nasty
letter. I have always, in the few cases it has been, gotten an “Oh
sorry, professor”―in one case, exactly those two words. But it is
still nerve-wracking to get that.
So how do you solve it, and especially given David’s point that
other countries do have clearer systems, do have the equivalent of
fair use codified, ordinarily do it in a more narrow fashion, and the
negotiation process that leads to codifying anything tends to favor
those who do not favor broad fair use conceptions?85 So I will
leave it there for the panel to answer.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Susan, what have you been doing
that you are getting cease-and-desist letters?
QUESTIONER [Professor Scafidi]: I will say nothing.
MS. QUILTER: Okay. Well, I will jump in very quickly on
the methodology.
The first question was, what was the
methodology by which we determined fair use or substantive
problems with the underlying claim, those kinds of questions.
There were actually two studies.86 I cannot speak as intimately
to the first study, although my colleague did it. But they basically
broke it down into five categories, which included a strong
underlying rights claim, whether it be trademark or copyright; a
weak underlying rights claim; a strong fair use or free expression
defense; a pretty good fair use or free expression defense; and an
ambiguous, not very well known. Within those, they basically just
went through the straightforward analyses that are applicable in
trademark and in fair use and looked at whether there was a market
effect, whether the work was significantly transformative. For
them, if there was a competitor involved, they considered that to be
a market effect, and so against fair use.
They weighed
transformative very high. They looked at questions in terms of the
underlying claim.
They looked at questions of copyrightability of subject matter,
which turns out to be a big problem, because people are confused
about what copyrights cover, as you guys have pointed out. I mean
85
86

See supra notes 32–49 and accompanying text (Carson comments).
See supra note 24.
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they do not cover ideas; they do not cover necessarily very short
phrases or titles.87 So people get really confused about what
copyright covers and they make a lot of very broad claims.
In our study, we also had to deal with the fair use analysis and
basically go through that. For all of these things, we tried to take a
fairly conservative approach, because you really do not want
someone to go back and look at that and say, “What are you
talking about?” and really start attacking our data that way.
But I think it is reasonable actually to say twenty to thirty
percent, because people just dash these letters and these notices
off. It is very easy for them to do that. So, it is not really
surprising to me that they are doing that.
In fact, I am not sure that it is necessarily a big problem in the
§ 512 context if there is a remedy to deal with it, if people are
aware of their counter-notice rights and have some way to respond
to it effectively, or if there is a good judicial remedy. The problem
with the § 512 process is that there really is no good judicial
remedy.88 The standard for going into court and saying, “Well,
they did this and they were trying to intimidate me” is incredibly
high. It has to be an intentional misrepresentation,89 which is not
going to get at the blustery language that many lawyers use when
they are trying to get someone to remove something that affronts
them.
It is not going to get at people’s just honest confusion about the
fact that “you are posting this photograph of my daughter online
and that really upsets me. But actually you are the photographer
and you are the copyright holder, so I really cannot send a DMCA
notice after you, but you are violating my privacy rights.” So
people are misusing the law to get at all these very legitimate
interests, and that is not going to be taken care of in any way.
I feel that it actually ends up giving short shrift to the rights
that we need to be addressing. I mean there are lots of privacy
87

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); see also Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp.,
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rights that we should be addressing and dealing with, and we are
not, because people are just dashing off § 512 notices.
That is a quick answer for the methodology―basically you just
have to kind of go through fair use analyses. I think both studies
privileged transformative uses and looked at copyrightable subject
matter and took a fairly strict line in terms of competition,
competitive commercial uses.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: The second question, I think, turns
more on the question of normative approaches to cease-and-desist
letters, which is: Is it better to move towards a world where we
have more enumeration of different rights, or do we want to retain
the kind of flexibility and the malleability that fair use has at its
core.
David, did you want to answer?
MR. CARSON: I am not sure if I am going to answer that
question specifically. My first response would be “have a
backbone.”
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Have a what?
MR. CARSON: A backbone, when you get one of those things.
I have been in government since 1997, so I really have not had to
deal with cease-and-desist letters.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: It is easy for you to say, then, isn’t
it?
MR. CARSON: It is easier for me to say. But I have received
plenty of them as counsel for corporate clients back in the mostly
pre-Internet age. I will grant the volume, I am sure, is much
different now, and just the magnitude of it alters the nature of the
problem.
But I would say, going back many, many years now, easily
fifty percent of the cease-and-desist letters I saw were just plain
frivolous. Let’s face it, if there is anything almost as bad as a
blatant infringer it is an overzealous copyright owner. But the fact
of the matter is that copyright owners feel overly protective of their
works and of their rights, and if they think they’ve got a leg to
stand on, and often if they don’t think they have a leg to stand on,
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they are going to assert infringement because they know a lawyer’s
letter is enough to scare most people off.
So, in principle, the answer is do not be scared by it. In
principle, the answer is find yourself someone who knows
copyright law, a copyright lawyer who knows copyright law, and
let them write a nasty letter back. My experience tells me that
when that nasty letter does go back, it goes away.
Now, that’s easy to say, harder to do. Maybe part of the
answer to that is contribute to Hugh’s clinic,90 because we all know
access to legal resources is incredibly difficult. When I was in
private practice, I knew that if I ever got in trouble and got sued, I
could not afford myself. And that is true of most people.
So it is a big problem. You do need to think hard about ways
to give the right resources to people who find themselves in the
situation―both authors who have claims who cannot afford to
present them, and people who find themselves at the receiving end
of one of these letters and have no one to turn to and no one to
speak for them.
Last year, in the context of the orphan works study that the
Copyright Office did and the legislative proposal, which went
fairly far through Congress, one of the issues that was raised by
authors, photographers, and so on was: Look, you are whittling
away at our rights at a time when we cannot enforce the rights we
have because we cannot afford to play the game of litigation in the
federal courts.
There were proposals, which Congress started thinking about,
and I think will continue to think about, of alternative means for
copyright owners to assert small claims that do not get them
sucked into the federal judicial system, where if your claim is not
worth tens and tens and tens of thousands of dollars at a minimum,
it is just not worth pursuing it.
We heard some things―not enough, but some complaints―by
people on the other side: “I got a cease-and-desist letter;” “I got
sued for copyright infringement”; “I did not think I was doing
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anything wrong, but I had to buckle under because I could not
afford a lawyer.”
Thought needs to be given to how you give people the means
of access to resources to defend themselves as well. We need to
think hard about alternative fora, alternative means, where you can
perhaps even force some of these claims, those below a certain
value anyway, into another forum where it is easier to find a
resolution.
The law is fine. It is the resources basically and what people
do with the law that’s the problem.
MS. QUILTER: Let me just add on to that. I would actually
tinker with the law. I think the law is not entirely fine.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Hold on, hold on. John hasn’t
spoken yet.
MR. PALFREY: That’s okay, Hugh. I cede.
MS. QUILTER: Okay. Just really quickly to add on, I think
that educating consumers and getting consumers resources to deal
with this will help build a backbone. We are also going to try to
work on developing best practices for OSPs so that they know to
educate consumers when they get that information. I will leave it
at that.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: John?
MR. PALFREY: I would just empathize slightly and say, in
fact, go as far as the § 512(f) provision more frequently. I think
that one of the matters―we were one of many clinics defending
people―was when Diebold asserted its rights over certain
copyrighted materials and so forth in the context of security
concerns over voting machines91―I do not know whether people
followed this case. There were a bunch of Swarthmore students,
Harvard students, and others. The Harvard student we defended in
this exact context was one of several. He is now an advocate at
EFF, as it turns out. But some of these cases were brought to the
court, and Diebold was found to be liable and having overreached.
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See Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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So, I think that there are many more cases in which firmer
pushback would, in fact, be better. I think that may go to Hugh’s
point, which is the more that we can get the law elucidated by
virtue of bringing cases that do define these limits in such a way
and take advantage of what is fully there,92 I think that is a huge
part of the answer.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: One other thing. James Boyle down
at Duke, with Jennifer Jenkins and Keith Aoki, produced this
cartoon book of what documentary filmmakers can and cannot
do.93 Best practices guides like this give users a lot of guidance
and support. That is a tremendous value. If we could do that in
more industries, it gives the moral backbone to somebody to resist
and say, “I have this on my side.”
I think in most of these cases—I think David is right—
overreaching copyright industry representatives will ultimately
back down.94 I am not sure when they will back down.
And that is important because they can kill a project if you
cannot initially clear the rights either to the satisfaction of
insurance company to obtain backers, just because of that letter.
So, you really need, not just backbone, but you need something
more on your side.
MR. PALFREY: Comic books.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Okay, great.
Next question?
QUESTION: My name is Devrim Elci. I am a second-year law
student here at Fordham, so obviously I am no expert on copyright.
But I notice you guys were talking about educating people as to the
effects of the counter-notice letters.
You mentioned, Professor Hansen, that summary judgment is
becoming more common in this context.95 I am wondering―we
92
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have heard things in places like medical malpractice, the idea of
setting up a separate sort of expert advisory panel that filters
through frivolous claims. Are there rationales for or against
something like that in the copyright context, where you get so
many of these claims that are frivolous, and maybe we ought to
have somebody whose only job is to get rid of them?
PROFESSOR KATYAL: The question is: Do we want some
sort of administrative kind of ad-hoc agency that is specially
charged―
QUESTIONER [Mr. Elci]: To clarify or define, so that we cut
down on the amount of overreaching.
MR. CARSON: If you gave us the resources, we would love to
do it.
When I was in private practice, most of my time was spent
defending copyrights, and most of the cases were prime for
summary judgment because they were simply silly. People made
outrageous claims of copyright infringement.
So, I am
preconditioned to look at most copyright infringement claims with
a healthy skepticism, apart from cases where people are actually
taking an entire work and redistributing it or something, which is a
whole different situation.
I do not know about the volume, whether the volume of
specious claims is so high―although, from Laura’s study, perhaps
it is96―where you really need to set up a mechanism like that. But
it certainly is something that has occurred to me, that if there was
some way to screen those out, whether it is an administrative
mechanism or something else, it would be a great idea. For too
many claims, just to get to summary judgment is going to cost you
tens of thousands of dollars. Who can afford that?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Well, first of all, you might have a
Seventh Amendment problem if you have screening out of things
before they are allowed to bring it.97 What you might do is add
$10 to the registration fee and create a fund.

96
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See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (Quilter Comments).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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MR. CARSON: Everybody liked it when we increased the fee
this year, so that is a great idea.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Who is “they?”
MR. CARSON: Everyone.
MR. AIKEN: Authors are really big fans of registration fees.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: And did you care one whit? No. So
increase it $10 more for a good cause and create a fund. Maybe
some of that money can go to people who cannot afford to litigate.
At least try it. You know, you are big on this fighting back. Let’s
see some action.
MR. CARSON: All right. How about a fee shifting? We’ve
got a fee-shifting provision right now which gives the court
discretion. I am thinking out loud here. How about we have some
kind of mechanism where it is prescreened by some agency, expert
panel, whatever? If that panel says it is not a meritorious claim
and it proceeds to court, unless you win as the plaintiff in court,
you do pay the attorney’s fees; and it is full attorney’s fees, the
court has no discretion. That is not bad. It may not be enough, but
it is a step in the right direction.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: If you win.
MR. CARSON: I am the defendant. The expert said I should
not even be sued. The plaintiff takes me to court anyway.
Somehow I find the means to fight, maybe because I’ve got a
lawyer who is convinced it is a frivolous claim, knowing that if at
the end of the day if the court agrees that it should never have been
brought, I get every dime I spent and then some. Not a bad idea.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: That’s not bad.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Well, we heard it here first.
Let’s actually go on to another question. Go ahead.
QUESTION: Thank you. William Tennant, Fordham LL.M.
student.
My question is to the entire panel. Would you address the
intersection of contract law with this fair use? Particularly,
couldn’t a Web site put up something about arbitration or
something to maybe contract away liability, in a sense?
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PROFESSOR KATYAL: A question about contract interfaces
with copyright and its impact on fair use.
MS. QUILTER: Well, I guess there are several pieces to that.
One is Web sites are putting up things like this all the time when
they are doing creative comments licensing or they are doing
licensing agreements, so they are just sort of unilaterally licensing
out material under particular terms.
The second thing is, in terms of―I am not quite sure I am
envisioning what you are proposing, but something along the lines
of, say, some sort of click-wrap, “click here to agree that if you
read my content you will subject yourselves to arbitration in the
state of Utah”―I would personally find that problematic from a
free expression point of view. I think I am going to let it go to my
other panelists.
MR. PALFREY: Just on that narrow point, if that were where
you were going―no, not that way. All right. I won’t go that way
then. There happens to be case law on that.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Okay. Another question?
QUESTION: I am Joe Teague. I am a student here at
Fordham.
Mr. Palfrey, you were talking about mash-ups before.98 At the
beginning of the Symposium, there was some discussion of
sampling, although digital sampling did not really come up. The
whole question of fair use with sampling versus mash-ups seemed
to be taking different approaches. Sampling seems to have become
a real licensing regime but mash-ups, not. But they seem to be sort
of different flavors of the same sort of thing. I am wondering why
there are two different routes for those two similar sorts of uses.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: A question about mash-ups and
whether or not they are treated differently under copyright law.
John, do you want to take that?
MR. PALFREY: Sure. I do not think that they necessarily are,
but I think you are hitting exactly the point that I was trying to get
at in some ways, which is I am all for informality of the sort that
98
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Laura has suggested.99 I think it is great. I am all for creative
comments licenses and implied licenses and some of these various
other ways of arranging for allowing somebody else to reuse your
material in a mash-up kind of context.
But I do not think that the law is any different in the traditional
sampling context than in the mash-up context. But I do think that
somehow, in the way that people conceive what they are doing, it
is being conceived of differently. I guess my fear is only that,
without elucidating best practices or without this informality
somehow being worked into a sustainable system, as more money
flows into the mash-up world effectively, more people have more
capital engaged in it, and more people are making more money off
of advertising, and search on top of it, the problem that you raise is
going to result in a whole lot of litigation.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Okay, great. Question—go ahead.
QUESTION: Thank you. I am a Fordham student.
I wanted to ask Mr. Carson in particular, and the rest of the
panel also, what you think about addressing the problem of
copyright protection devices that preclude the possibility of your
even reaching the point of whether or not infringement was
frivolous.
MR. CARSON: Can you elaborate? I am not sure I know
where you are going.
QUESTIONER: What I mean is that in a digitally protected
device you do not anymore have the opportunity to infringe, even
if you would have a fair use defense. Therefore, the default has
become that there is no possibility of using it for fair use.
MR. CARSON: I think the question has to do with copyright
protection devices that are deployed that might prevent you from
doing anything so that anyone could even make a determination of
whether it is infringing or not, I gather.
All I can tell you is what has been presented to us in the year
2000, in the year 2003, and now this year. The whole point of the
rulemaking we are engaging in is to take a look at what is
99
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happening currently out there in the marketplace, and determine to
what extent access controls―and this deals only with access
controls; things that prevent copying, and so on, are outside our
purview―are actually being used in ways that prevent people from
engaging in non-infringing uses.
It is a pretty passive operation on our part. We take in
comments, we hold hearings so people can come testify, and they
present to us the information they have and the arguments they
have and so on. The conclusions we have drawn are that, with a
few exceptions―and those exemptions have been reflected in two
exemptions in 2000, four exemptions in 2003; this year, if you
follow the math, you might be able to make a prediction of how
many exemptions there will be, but who knows.
In any event, what we found is, by and large, we are not at a
point yet―and we may never be, because it is not in copyright
owners’ interests probably to get to that point; that would be my
position―but at least we are not at a point now, with some
exceptions, where works are put out there in ways that there is no
way to make non-infringing uses of them.
Now, I will give you one example that was a real easy one,
although it is a harder one to necessarily make now. In the year
2000, there was all sorts of talk about movies on DVDs and how
you cannot break through the encryption. Well, it was real easy for
us to say, “Yeah, but they are all out on VHS tapes too, so you
really can make the kind of use you want to make by going to that
alternative format.” That’s a lot harder to say now. How many
movies are released on VHS anymore? So, it gets a little different.
But I will have to say the cases that were made to us on movies
on DVDs, with perhaps an exception―we will have to wait and
see―were not persuasive to us that there really is a problem, in the
sense that people are not able to find a way to do what they feel
they need to do, in a way that we felt was a non-infringing use in
any event.
So, the risk is there, and there are some areas where it has been
a problem. To take one example, I mentioned the one with
filtering software that was a problem.
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Another one was the blind, e-books for the blind―you are
blind, you get an e-book. E-books have a read-aloud function so
you can listen to it. And there is something even more
sophisticated in the read-aloud function, called a screen reader,
which actually, as I understand it, allows you to navigate through
the book―take you to the table of contents, maybe even to an
index, listen to the table of contents and say, “I want to go to
Chapter 7; that is what I want to hear.”
Most e-books, I think, now―we don’t really have
statistics―have those functions enabled. Some do not. When they
do not have that enabled and you are blind, you buy that e-book
and you cannot get to it. Why not? No one has really been able to
explain to us why not.
We issued an exemption three years ago.100 One is before us
this year again. It does not sound to us from everything we have
heard as though copyright owners intentionally were disabling that
function. It is just that they clicked the wrong box and it is out
there, and therefore it is not enabled.
What we concluded three years ago was that this is an area
where the system does not seem to be working. Whether
intentionally or not―we made no evaluation―there was overprotection in a way that had prevented people from engaging in
non-infringing uses, and there is really no other satisfactory way
for them to be able to do what they need to do. We said, “Fine,
that is an area where people should be able to do that.”
So, I am not saying that the rulemaking is perfect, and I am not
saying that the way we have done it in the past has necessarily
been the right way. What I guess I am saying is if you look at how
we do it this year, you might see a change in approach. But it is
one way of looking at it.
To the extent that it brings in information―which anyone can
look at and make their own evaluation of, which may differ from
ours―what it tells me is that so far it has not been a major
problem, with some relatively minor exceptions.

100

37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2003).

PANEL_III_FORMATTED_050807

1068

5/8/2007 1:04:06 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:1017

MR. AIKEN: I would like to address that for a minute. I think
there is a fundamental misconception here, that fair use somehow
implies a right to free access. That has never been the case. To
make fair use of a movie pre-digital age, someone has to have
bought a legitimate copy. Maybe it is a library, a university,
whatever, but someone has to have bought the legitimate copy that
you would the make fair use of, or someone has to have bought a
legitimate copy of the book that you would make fair use of. You
cannot say, “Because there is fair use I get to look at something for
free.”
Also, fair use does not say that you have to make it
technologically easy to copy something. Just because you cannot
make a digital copy of the DVD does not mean you cannot display
the movie on a nice flat-panel screen, use a digital camera to
capture that, and then put it on your own DVD or videotape. Fair
use does not say it has to be easy.
For a book, it has traditionally been you have had to type in
what you want to make fair use of to include it in your manuscript.
No matter what protection you put on an e-book reading device,
you can always re-key it into your own work as long as you have
access to a legitimate copy.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: John, do you want to respond, and
then Laura?
MR. PALFREY: Just very, briefly. It is a great question. I
think if you take the frame of it to say how often can DRM101
trump fair use―and setting aside the § 1201 situation,102 because I
think there are situations in which people do not have the technical
ability to do the hacking in order to exercise this fair use―there is
a policy argument as to whether or not you should be able to do
that.
But I think it might link up to what the gentleman in the blue
shirt, the LL.M. student, was talking about perhaps, of contract
trumping fair use as well, can you use contract as a means to trump
it. I think it goes right back to Sonia’s initial framing of it―which
101
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is: is this a defense; is it a right; how do you conceive of what fair
use is?―and then say, “Okay, you should not be able to use
contract to trump it” or “you should not be able to use DRM to do
it,” or “you should, but then there are exceptions and so forth.”
But I think that is an area where the law is not all that clear,
frankly.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Laura?
MS. QUILTER: Let me just add another point to this, putting
on my librarian hat for a moment, because I was a librarian before
I became an attorney. That is, that we are in really a tremendously
tumultuous moment, where we are not just dealing with old rights
that have already existed simply in different forms. We are dealing
with new abilities to manipulate content, new types of content, new
forms of art, and we have to really come to grips with the fact that
actually there may not be good metaphors in the old ways for
doing these things. We just have to apply our principles to come
up with the new answers.
The thing that I am thinking of, in particular, is that most forms
of DRM actually do not expire. As a librarian and an archivist, by
inclination, if not by profession, this is a problem. So, you can
look at the Library of Congress’ fabulous works, and the Library of
Congress for a number of years has been designating a few select
works of film every year as like really great works of film that we
should preserve for all time. But that has left us with thousands
and millions of films that are decaying, that are basically being lost
to history, because there simply are not enough resources to
preserve them.
DRM is basically creating such a situation for us when we do
not have the opportunity to circumvent it, and we may not be able
to, even after copyright expires, if we end up in a situation where
we cannot preserve things. I’m thinking not just of the typical
works of film or whatever, but look at these DVDs.
I was looking at a CD the other day from the mid-1990s and it
was a work of art. It had menuing, it had this whole interface.
This is a work of art that actually is not going to exist really ever
again, because CDs as ways of distributing content are kind of
passé. We use them to quickly back stuff up, but we are not going
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to create these elaborate menuing structures, with folding-out
things and fabulous graphics. That in itself is a work of art. I will
be surprised if we do not in ten years see a real market of
memorabilia in CD-ROMs from the mid-1990s and early-1990s.
What are librarians supposed to do with that? I am telling you
that in a hundred years CD players are going to be nonexistent in
libraries. Librarians and archivists who want to collect and take
this material need to be able to get access to it; they need to be able
to circumvent it. We can come up with individual circumventions
in particular situations, but that is going to be a problem for us. If
you have to circumvent every single type, it is just a big problem.
So, that is just one tiny example of the kinds of problems that
this can create when you are bringing in technical protection
measures. You have contract on top of that and you have the law
dealing with all of this. I think it can create real muddles that are
not going to adequately protect all of the interests and rights at
stake with new forms of media and new uses.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Okay, great.
Next question?
QUESTION: Thank you. My name is David Rigney. I am an
attorney in private practice in New York.
I would like to address a general question to the panel. That is,
your views, your experience, in the application of fair use in the
context of the rights of photographers. My premise is that the
issues involved in the reproduction, the transmission of an entire
work―for example, a photograph―may have a different context
and flavor from excerpting or otherwise copying from printed
works.
Then, as a follow-up to David Carson, if you would comment
on your views on the status of the orphan rights proposal,103 which,
as I think you know, is of great concern to photographers
generally.
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PROFESSOR KATYAL: So the questions are, is photography
different than other types of media and what is the status of the
orphan works legislation.
QUESTIONER [Mr. Rigney]: And the application of fair use
principles.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think that generally photographers
are screwed royally. That’s just life. Some people, I don’t know.
It’s a tough life.
But no, of course it is not a fair use to take the whole thing
commercially. The real thing about photographers is they are in a
situation where they do not have a lot of money. They are one of
these groups that actually, on the other side, really need help to
protect their rights. But if you look at the Internet, it is ninety-five
percent a copyright-free zone, of which five percent of people are
concerned and doing something about it. That five percent,
though, is where the money is made.
So, photographers have to get into a situation where they can
protect their rights in that five percent. If they have the resources,
then I think the law will protect them. The question is they are
small individuals, usually, with a million photographs. They do
not even know who is using it half the time. It is a tough life.
Maybe they should teach.
MR. AIKEN: Photographers were big backers of the proposal
that was floated last year in the spring for a small claims court for
copyright, and they should be, because their stuff is taken over and
over again. The hurdle of getting into federal court is way too high
for individual photographers, as it is for authors. We are backers
of that as well.
We did a survey of our members about whether they would
favor a small claims court for copyright. They are strongly in
favor of it.
I think we have to come up with some sort of tribunal that can
handle these very clear cases of copyright infringement. Not
where there is some colorable fair use defense―that should be
pulled out of such a tribunal―but where there is no colorable fair
use defense and it is plain infringement, there has to be an easy
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way for photographers, graphic artists, and individual authors to
get into court.
It may be that that sort of tribunal is the place to handle these
frivolous cease-and-desist letters as well. I think that might be an
interesting confluence of interests on both sides of the copyright
aisle.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: David, did you want to respond to
the question on the status of the orphan works?
MR. CARSON: Right. Well, first of all, current status, I guess,
was part of your question; is that right?
QUESTIONER: If that is available.
MR. CARSON: The current status is it made its way through
the House Judicial Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property. It made its way almost to consideration by
the full Committee, until Chairman Smith of the Subcommittee
pulled it, literally at the hearing where he was going to move it
forward.
Some people think perhaps he pulled it because he did not
think it was going to get through the Committee. That is not what
he said. I think what he said is more along the lines this was the
very end of the Congress; even if it got through this Committee, it
was not going to get its way all through Congress this year; and he
knew it was going to require a lot of people to take a tough
position, because folks like photographers were certainly pushing
very hard not to enact it.
It will come back next year. Is it going to get enacted? I do
not know. But I am reasonably certain that it will be high on the
agenda of folks in Congress who can make it―not necessarily
make it happen, but make it get early consideration.
The photographers have probably been the most vocal
opponents. It is easy to understand why. I may be the last
remaining person on earth who really liked the 1909 Copyright
Act.104 I think it was a wonderful law. I think the notion of

104

The Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (amended 1976).
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requiring copyright notice was great. I think a relatively short
term, renewable if you wanted it renewed, was wonderful.
We do not have that anymore. As a result, you are a copyright
owner for your life plus seventy years, whether you want to be or
not. That is a problem.
Because the law has been so generous to copyright owners,
now you can publish your work without worrying about putting a
copyright notice on it; you can make your work available and put it
out there without doing anything to make yourself locatable. I
think the copyright owners who find themselves in this situation
bear some of the responsibility for the problem by not really
making it easy to find them. “I want to use this work. I don’t
know who wrote it. I don’t know who took the photograph. Or,
even if I do, I have no way of finding them now.”
QUESTIONER: Could I just make a brief response to that?
MR. CARSON: Of course.
QUESTIONER: I understand that. But given the effect of
digital technology, it is a Catch-22, that if your image is
misappropriated, if the copyright notice that the photographer and
his digital archive have placed on it is erased, and then the
conclusion is reached, “Oh, you were somehow at fault in not
giving notice,” I think that is a completely illogical and invalid
conclusion.
MR. CARSON: I couldn’t agree more. But nevertheless there
are things that copyright owners and photographers can do. It is
much easier to think about that going forward than it is to think
about it going backwards, although there are ways to deal with it
going backwards too.
One of the things we have been pressing on the representatives
of photographers is that they need to figure out how you can create
databases whereby photographers can put their photos up in ways
that someone who wants to find out who owns the rights to this
photograph can find out by going to a database, or one of a number
of databases, searching for it.
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We are told, although I don’t know the facts, that there are
technologies that actually can allow you to search for images. I am
sure that will get better over time.
The more photographers do, presumably through their own
organizations, which may have more resources than any individual
photographer clearly would have, perhaps people will even find
that this could be a profit-making activity. If there are places one
can go when one wants to know who is the owner of the copyright
in this particular photograph or this particular work, and you can
go there and you find the owner, then that solves the orphan work
problem.
So there are things that can be done, at least in theory. I am not
saying it is necessarily easy. But I know that representatives of
photographers are seriously looking at it. That is one of the things
that we are trying to encourage.
The idea is not primarily to allow people to use works when
they cannot find the copyright owner. If nothing else succeeds,
okay. But the idea is to help people find the copyright owner and
then strike the deal.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Okay. So Laura, Paul, and then John
can respond.
MS. QUILTER: Two quick comments.
One is photographers are in a pickle if their work subsists only
in a printed form. So the photographer from 1930 who has a print
photograph, it can be very difficult to track that. I actually think
electronic files can really help solve this, because formats can have
metadata which can include that. Yes, the metadata can be erased,
but if somebody signed their name, that can be cropped as well.
So I actually think electronic photography can be very helpful to
photographers in terms of keeping their material out there.
On the arbitrage or alternative dispute resolution, actually I
want to put in a pitch for § 512.105 I think that it works pretty well
for small rights holders. With the § 512(c) provision,106 it is very
efficient―too efficient―for rights holders in terms of getting their
105
106

17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
Id. § 512(c).
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material off of the Internet. Where I find a problem is that rights
holders are overbroad and that there is no really effective way to
respond to that. But I do think that, in terms of Internet
distributions, § 512 becomes a cheap and efficient way for rights
holders to deal with distributions of their content.107
MR. AIKEN: On orphan works, authors are on both sides of
the issue. They’ve got their works, copyrighted works, that they
do not want being deemed orphan because someone cannot locate
the author at the moment they are looking. But they also want to
make use of stuff that is out there, particularly old letters, diaries,
things of historic interest. They want to be able to use that stuff,
incorporate that into their own works.
We were not big fans of the orphan works proposal because we
think it should have made more distinctions between works that
were clearly created to exploit the commercial value, when you’ve
got a manuscript or a book that someone was creating to exploit
the commercial value; as opposed to letters, diaries, notes, where
there is not that sort of intent. There should be a distinction in the
law made between those and how “orphan-able” such works are.
For photographers, it is a particular problem, because how do
you distinguish by looking at a photograph whether someone
intended to commercially exploit it or not? I do not know how
often people need to make fair use of a photograph where they
cannot find the rights holder. I do not know how often it comes
up.
One thing I think that has not been looked at with these orphan
works proposals is that it essentially creates a duty of availability
on the copyright holder; it says you have to be available. It is not a
problem for the corporate copyright holders. Big publishers, the
Hollywood industry, they are going to be available and people will
find them. It is a problem for individuals, however, being
available.
And it is not just available to people in the United States,
because our law is intended to incorporate also foreign works.108
107
108

See id. § 512.
See, e.g., id. § 104 (2000).
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Foreign works can be orphaned as well. Other countries are
looking at us and seeing what we are doing. So now we have
Australia looking at what the United States is doing. If we pass an
orphan works law, we can be sure that Australia, England, South
Africa, India, and China will pass similar laws. And, since you can
put stuff on the Internet as a result of these orphan works
processes, we will have a global duty to be available; and, if you
are not available, the penalty is your work is put in this quasipublic domain and you may lose all the value of it. So I think there
are a lot of problems with the law as it was proposed.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: John?
MR. PALFREY: Just since it is important that every member
of the panel speak on these good questions, of course.
To your first point, about where is fair use in the context of
reproduction of photographs, I totally agree with you that there is
no issue with respect to service standard photographs. But the
heat, I think, to follow on Laura’s insight about § 512(d),109 is in
the search engine space.
So the two cases, or sort of chain of cases, are Kelly v. Ariba
Soft110 and then more recently the Perfect 10 case,111 which call
into question some of what was in that context.
So I think if you are looking to where is the interesting fair use
question, it is not so much the standard direct liability; it is actually
in the direct and secondary liability for intermediaries, who are
increasingly in this sort of money-making posture, clearly, but then
also where more pressure is being placed on them. Joel
Reidenberg has written about this as well in the Internet law
context.112
PROFESSOR HANSEN: That is an area where I thought the
courts did a pretty good job. The Perfect 10 case was also
Solomonic in its attempt to give something to each side based on

109

See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (Quilter comments)
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 583–85 (1998).
110
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close factual analysis.113 So I think the courts have basically done
a good job on fair use when they are actually presented with it. It
goes back to the problem of how do we get some of these things
before them.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: Next question?
QUESTION: Most of the panelists have expressed concern
about the chilling effect of various things like notices that may be
against people doing legitimate fair use and the like. To what
extent do you think that the uncertainty in the law in some of these
areas effectively acts as a chilling effect?
To pick a real example, an author I know is concerned about
something that she wanted to do that maybe was a transformative
use. Now that the Second Circuit has come down with its
opinion,114 I still have no idea whether it is a transformative use or
not. That uncertainty is causing her not to produce the work that
she was going to produce. I would be interested in the panelists’
views on that.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: The future of transformative use
under copyright. Go ahead.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I will say something about
transformative use. Transformative use is a derivative work, for
which there is a right. So the idea that “if it is transformative, you
are okay” is crazy. All that the courts are really trying to talk
about is transformative in the context of a fair use between
something that is intrinsic. The normal use of something that is
transformative is that there is a thumb down on the scale on the
transformative.
There is no case that says if it is transformative it is fair use. In
Acuff-Rose, they said, “No, it can be a parody, and it can be news
reporting, or it can be all these other things that maybe do things

113

Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (“The Court now concludes that Google’s creation
and public display of ‘thumbnails’ likely do directly infringe [Perfect 10]’s copyrights.
The Court also concludes, however, that [Perfect 10] is not likely to succeed on its
vicarious and contributory liability theories.”).
114
See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
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with things.”115 But that does not mean they are fair use. You still
have to go through the complete four-factor analysis.
But what it has morphed into now is “if it is transformative it is
okay.” No, it is not okay. You still have to go through the normal
fair use analysis. So just your statement, “it’s transformative but
she’s not sure she can do it”—of course she shouldn’t be sure that
she can do it. You have to look at it very fact-specific in a
situation. That is just the way it is.
MR. CARSON: I think the more accurate statement is if it is
not transformative, the odds that it is a fair use are relatively low.
If it is transformative, you may have leapt over one hurdle but
you’ve still got some other tests to meet.
MS. QUILTER: I would add that I believe that the chilling
effect in terms of practice is quite high from the uncertainty.
Publishers, for instance, are very reluctant to step into situations
where they have to rely on fair use. Documentary filmmakers, as
has been well documented, have a lot of difficulty getting material
distributed because their distributors, their film festivals, all want
insurance coverage.116 The insurers are really leery of fair use. I
think this story goes on in really almost any form of media.
I think that anybody who is the gatekeeper, who has some sort
of role in distributing material, but is not wedded to the material
and treating it as the child of their heart and their last three years of
work, does not really have that much of a vested interest in getting
it out there if there is some risk of liability. So I think that the
chilling effect from gatekeepers’ roles is quite significant.
MR. CARSON: And it is not just people who do not have the
resources to fight. Keep in mind most copyright owners are also
copyright users. You look at what they do in Hollywood, it is nuts.
They will pay for anything just to avoid a possible claim. They
pay for rights to use things that anyone looking at would say, “Of
course that is a fair use” or “it is not even infringement in the first
place.”

115
116

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994).
See, e.g., Boyle et al., supra note 93.
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But there is this culture where if I can just pay whoever might
have a claim against me, then I do not have to worry about it down
the road. The cost/benefit analysis may or may not make sense,
but the result is that you do not have the precedent out there,
whether it is legal or just precedent in terms of what is actually
going on in the world, that any rational person looking at how
copyright law really operates would imagine you ought to have.
Again, it is largely, I think, because of the cost of vindicating
your rights in our system.
MR. AIKEN: There definitely is a chilling effect. That is
something else we have surveyed our members on. When faced
with something where they could not get permission, there is―I
cannot remember the percentage now―there is a certain
percentage who just avoid it entirely or paraphrase. But, a larger
percentage take a smaller chunk and declare it for themselves to be
fair use.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: In the back?
QUESTION: My name is Britton Payne. I am with the
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law
Journal.
I wanted to ask a question about the fourth factor, the effect on
the marketplace, and direct it particularly to Professor Palfrey, but
I am certainly curious to hear what everybody has to say.
Professor Hansen, in talking about the interplay between
Arriba Soft and Perfect 10, discussed how the court goes into an
analysis of the market impact of the use of thumbnails in search
engines.117 It says that because you can use a thumbnail-size
photograph on a cell phone and there is a potential market for that,
it is an inappropriate use under the fourth-factor analysis of fair
use.118
But what, really, is the marketplace that we should be looking
at in terms of temporality? Soon enough your cell phone image is
117

Compare Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821–22 (9th Cir. 2003), with
Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 850–51; see also Britton Payne, Comment, Imperfect
10: Digital Advances and Market Impact in Fair Use Analysis, 17 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279 (2006).
118
Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851.
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going to be far more complex than the thumbnail image that you
would see in a Google image search. When we look at the
Grokster concurrences, we have Breyer saying, “look to forever in
the future.”119
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Forget about Breyer.
QUESTIONER [Mr. Payne]: And we have Ginsburg saying,
“Look to right now and the present uses.”120 So really what is the
appropriate limitation in the marketplace that we are looking at in
terms of temporality?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think it depends on whether you are
someone who is basically property based, and then the effect on
the market is going to be very strong; and if you are someone who
is not property-based, it is not going to be very strong, because you
are for redistribution of wealth probably in many areas, including
copyright. I mean you scratch any of the Copy Left—they are left.
That is why they are called Copy Left. The irony, of course, is that
the Copy Right are also left. So there is this weird thing where
most people in the copyright industry outside of copyright are for
redistribution of wealth. There is just almost a tribal split between
them when one side is trying to redistribute the other’s wealth.
But if you want to know the truth, forget Breyer and Stevens.
If you are looking at what the future holds, they aren’t the future.
What they say is nice or not nice, but it almost has no effect.
Breyer, or at least his clerks, seems to want Breyer to be the
“Copy Left Hero.” His concurrence in Grokster had all the
earmarks of a typically clerk-written opinion. But, in any case, I
do not think he has influence, in the area of IP, on the other justices
of the Court.
So if you want to look at the Court, look at Ginsburg, who is
probably the one that you should pay the most attention to. We
will see what the new Justices do.
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Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 952–54 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
120
Id. at 945–48 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Another example of the strong concern for market harm is clear
in Acuff-Rose.121 Everybody thinks Acuff-Rose was a win for
Luther Campbell, finding fair use for his “parody.” It was not a
win for Luther Campbell at all. The Court remanded for
consideration of the effect of Campell’s use of the song on the
potential licensing of “Pretty Woman” to the hip-hop market.122
That is an incredible concern. The idea that the song was going to
be licensed to the hip-hop market is almost ridiculous, but that was
the remand. That is how concerned the Court was with the impact
on a potential market for “Pretty Woman.”
I think potentially the fourth factor—I think O’Connor was
right in Harper & Row,123 even though to some extent Souter
pooh-poohed it in Acuff-Rose124—that fourth factor is the killer
factor. As soon as there is competition, someone is using the work
to compete with you, which is really what the fourth factor is: I
think you are almost always going to lose in fair use.
PROFESSOR KATYAL: John, do you want to comment?
MR. PALFREY: Sure. There is good reason that you are in
charge of the Journal, and it is a great question.
I think that there is no doubt but that the heat here is on the
fourth factor and no doubt that much of the uncertainty in the
application of fair use—which cynics call the right to hire a
lawyer, of course—is in how do you define the market? I think it
is analogous to the antitrust base, where the first thing you have to
look at and ask is, “What’s the market we are talking about for this
monopoly?” It is really hard to do. I think the courts are all over
the place.
The thing that makes me uncomfortable with the Perfect 10
Solomonic opinion is just what you note, which is sometimes in
the digital space―I guess always in the digital space―you have to
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Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Id. at 594.
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Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (“[The
fair use fourth factor of market impact] is undoubtedly the single most important element
of fair use”).
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freeze a moment in time and look at a technology as it stands right
now.125
I think we are in a time of enormous transformation. This
notion of the image as it applies on the cell phone, clearly we have
convergence of accessing digital space from all these different
devices. I think it is very hard to rely on that as the way to think
about the market. But I do not have a good answer. It is an
excellent question, and maybe there is a note or a journal article or
something in it.126
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Just leave Breyer out of it.127
PROFESSOR KATYAL: It looks like our time is up. Thanks
so much to everyone. For those of you who didn’t get a chance to
ask questions, there will be a reception outside so you can follow
up.
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Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). See also Payne,
supra note 117, at 290–91.
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